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INTRODUCTION
International human rights law is a body of rules primarily regu-
lating the rights and obligations individuals owe one another as mem-
bers of a collective society.' Humans' stay on earth is temporary, and
1 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) (A), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71-72, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]
The [United Nations) General Assembly,
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common stan-
dard of achievement for all peoples and all nations ....
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another
in a spirit of.brotherhood.
(emphasis omitted)). The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has held that
states have a positive obligation to prevent violations of human rights by private actors, and
therefore if human rights abuses occur, the state must show that it made its best effort to
prevent such violations. SeeVelsquez Rodrfguez Case, Case 4, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 35, OEA/
ser. C./No.4, doc. 13, paras. 165-167 (1988), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriec-
ing/serie_c_4_ing.doc.
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this fleeting visit does not come without transactional costs repre-
sented by exercising reciprocal rights and obligations we owe one an-
other as members of a collective society.2 However, this social quid pro
quo is attenuated on the human rights landscape when what is bar-
gained for and exchanged lacks the participatory input of all stake-
holders, resulting in exclusion and exploitation. The essence of
human rights law is to implement and enforce minimum standards 3 in
the regulation of individual and collective rights. What is required is
an entire transformative process where the quality of life for men, wo-
men and children is revolutionized.
The framework of structure and agency is useful in illustrating
the tension arising from institutional arrangements that have both lib-
erating and oppressive effects.4 Law, as a structural institution, not
only regulates rights and obligations, but also redefines and recreates
spaces in which individuals can negotiate and exploit both new and
existing rights and obligations. Yet only those who are aware of these
spaces and have the requisite vernacular to navigate them by virtue of
their training, wealth, and privilege are able to benefit from legal insti-
tutions. Thus, those who lack the sophistication and knowledge of the
institutional lingua franca are excluded or marginalized, and are
thereby severely disadvantaged.
The most empowering aspect of this theoretical framework is
agency-the ability of individuals to renegotiate, recontest, and rede-
fine their role within a given set of structures. 5 Agency describes indi-
viduals' ability to make institutional arrangements accountable to
them.6 Law is empowering because it creates room for maneuverabil-
ity, allowing one to make incremental changes to repressive struc-
tures. Ideally, it strives for a policy that is beneficial to the whole,
whether attainable or not. The view of some legal scholars that law
should not be used as a society-wide insurance policy simply exposes
2 Douglass C. North, Nobel Laureate, argues that societal success flourishes with the
existence of legal and governmental institutions that protect individual freedoms, enforce
contracts, combat crime, and provide access to the courts. See generally DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) (arriv-
ing at this conclusion).
3 See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 1.
4 See generally 21 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
14223-33 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) (describing the dynamic relation-
ship between structural arrangements and individual actors, and how various modifications
of it can effect social change).
5 Cf id at 14228-32 (discussing individual actors' attempts and ability to transform
structural arrangements leading to social change).
6 See id. at 14229-30.
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the reality that only a few are secure.7 Yet, intrinsic to the ideals of
human rights law is the protection of all human beings.8
This Note explores how the Alien Tort Claims Act, an instrument
of international law, can empower child soldiers (the agents) by hold-
ing weapons manufacturers accountable for the increased armed con-
flicts caused by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (the
structure). Through this case study, the Note seeks to illuminate the
strengths and limitations of international law in protecting defenseless
individuals. Structure and agency theory serves as the Note's guiding
principles. Part I outlines the foundational issues regarding small
arms and light weapons proliferation. It also highlights several failed
attempts by the international community to address this issue via trea-
ties and national legislation, thus necessitating another solution. Part
II further discusses the humanitarian consequences of the prolifera-
tion problem, specifically focusing on the plight of child soldiers. In
addition, it contains a general discussion of the international law gov-
erning children. Part III evaluates the Alien Tort Claims Act as a legal
mechanism that allows child soldiers to maneuver for change within
the status quo's oppressive structure. Finally, Part IV argues that gun
manufacturers who know or have reason to know that those to whom
they sell weapons use child soldiers should be liable under the Alien
Tort Claims Act.
I
THE ISSUE OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW)
"The most potent symbol of conflict and violence in the closing years of the
20th century [was] the AK47. '9
The prevailing literature is clear: small arms and light weapons 10
are causally related to international security and human rights
abuses.11 According to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
7 See, e.g., discussion infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (questioning the
proper role of tort law in domestic gun litigation).
8 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
9 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, DISARMAMENT AND CON-
FLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT, SMALL ARMS MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTHERN AF-
RICA 1 (1996) [hereinafter DISARMAMENT].
10 Small arms and light weapons include both military-style weapons and commercial
firearms (i.e., handguns and long guns). See GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUD-
IES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2001: PROFILING THE PROBLEM 8 (2001) [hereinafter SMALL ARMS
SURVEY]; see also DISARMAMENT, supra note 9, at xv-xvi ("Small arms ... include pistols,
machine-guns, rocket launchers, anti-personnel grenades and the . . . AK-47 assault
rifle.").
11 See, e.g., SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 2 (quoting United Nations Secretary-
General Kofi Annan: "The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed con-
flicts .... It undermines respect for international humanitarian law." (emphasis omitted));
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT, ARMING RWANDA: THE ARMS TRADE AND HUMAN
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Research, "small arms [are a] part of those sources of conflict that
have been called the 'proximate causes' of internal conflicts."' 2 In-
deed, "it is the proximate causes that transform potentially violent sit-
uations into full-scale confrontations." 13 The small arms and light
weapons 14 proliferation problem is a relatively new phenomenon on
the international scene.' 5 The roots of the problem can be traced to
the days of the Cold War when the United States and the Soviet Union
jockeyed for the loyalties of Third World nations.' 6 During this pe-
riod, these superpowers either donated weapons to developing na-
tions as "military aid," or granted them under "soft loan
arrangements."1 7 However, it was primarily the end of the Cold War
that caused small arms manufacturers to seek alternative markets
abroad and flock to developing countries in Asia and Africa to com-
pensate for domestic defense budget cuts.' 8
Because private companies produce most of the SALW, govern-
ments' control of the manufacture, possession, and trade in small
arms has decreased in recent years.19 As one recent survey noted, 600
manufacturing firms in approximately 95 countries produce small
arms, light weapons, or other types of ammunition and parts. 20 An-
other study estimated that approximately 385 manufacturing compa-
RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE RWANDAN WAR 4 (1994) ("The influx of weapons from foreign
sources . . . contribute[s] significantly to needless and abusive civilian deaths and
suffering.").
12 BOBI PIRSEYEDI, UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMENT RESEARCH, THE SMALL
ARMS PROBLEM IN CENTRAL ASIA: FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS 6 (2000).
13 Id.; see also Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1306 (2000), Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 167, U.N.
Doc. S/2000/1195 (2000) [hereinafter UN Panel of Experts] ("Small arms play an important
role in sustaining conflicts, in exacerbating violence, in contributing to the displacement
of innocent populations and threatening international law, and in fuelling crime and ter-
rorism."), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/SierraLeone/SL-
selectedEng.htm. This Note does not argue that the proliferation of small arms is the sole
proximate cause of conflicts around the world. Indeed other factors such as poverty, illiter-
acy, family issues and weak governance have a role to play. This Note simply argues that
SALW exacerbate conflicts, resulting in severe humanitarian abuses such as the illegal use
of children as combatants.
14 The scope of this problem ranges from human rights and humanitarian law to
public health, arms control and disarmament, and even to issues of terrorism and criminal-
ity. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 2.
15 Id.
16 See CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARMS TRADE, DEATH ON DELIVERY: THE IMPACT OF THE ARMS
TRADE ON THE THIRD WORLD 10 (1989).
17 Id.
18 See PIRSEvEDI, supra note 12, at 8; see also DISARMAMENT, supra note 9, at 1 (noting
that while "not purely a post-Cold War phenomenon .... the impact and social cost of
light weapons proliferation" grew with the withdrawal of superpower patronage).
19 See SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 7.
20 Id. at 3.
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nies in 64 countries produced arms in the 1990s-almost a two
hundred percent increase from the prior decade.
2 1
A. The Legal and Illegal Trade of SALW
While this Note specifically addresses the illicit 22 trade of arms, it
must be noted that the legal and illegal SALW trades go hand in
hand.23 This dual trade24 "passes through legal channels under the
guise of fulfilling a civilian function."25 Globally, the legal SALW
trade is valued at an estimated $4-6 billion annually, and accounts for
eighty to ninety percent of the total annual value of the small arms
trade.2 6 At the same time, SALW represent only five percent of the
total value of legal arms exports. 27 Although this is a small percent-
age, SALW exports account for as much as ninety percent of casualties
in armed conflicts.
28
In addition to this legal trade, 29 there is also a substantial illicit
SALW market. The illicit market includes
sales to recipient countries that have no identifiable legal govern-
ment or authority . . . and transfers by governments to non-state
actors (i.e. rebel and insurgent groups). In addition, there are cases
where governments illegally hire brokers to transfer weapons (e.g.
the 'Iran-Contra Affair'). Such transfers may be in violation of the
supplier and/or recipient country's national laws or policies. They
may also contravene international law. Regulating [this] market...
poses . . . the greatest challenge to the international community
today.
-3 0
21 See id. at 9; see also Ken Epps, Canadian Military Exports-No Change in Volume or
Practice, PLOUGHSCARES MONITOR (June 2001) ("Canada closed the first post-Cold War dec-
ade with arms exports 15 percent higher than when it began."), http://www.ploughshares.
ca/content/MONITOR/monj0lb.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
22 This Note uses the terms "illicit" and "illegal" interchangeably. The illicit market
has two interconnected areas, the "grey market" and the "black market." See SMALL ARMS
SURVEY, supra note 10, at 165. "[G]rey market transfers are usually covert, conducted by
governments, government-sponsored brokers, or other entities, that exploit loopholes or
intentionally circumvent national and/or international law or policies." Id. at 166 (empha-
sis added). Black market transfers, by contrast, include the "type of illegal arms 'traffick-
ing' tak[ing] place in clear violation of national and/or international laws and policies,
and without the government's official knowledge, consent, or control." Id.
23 See id. at 165-68.
24 See CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARMS TRADE, supra note 16, at 18-19.
25 Id. at 19 (italics omitted).
26 See SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 141.
27 See id. at 145.
28 See id.
29 Legal arms transfers are "those carried out by governments or their authorized
agents in accordance with both international and national laws and with the policies of
exporting and [importing] states." Id. at 141.
30 Id. at 166.
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It is this type of illicit small arms trade that fuels civil strife and
presents the largest global threat in terms of armed conflict.
3 1
B. The Relationship Between SALW and Armed Conflict
1. The Accessibility Thesis
The accessibility thesis posits that access to guns "facilitates vio-
lence. '32 Undoubtedly, this is a highly contested proposition. Propo-
nents of this theory argue that both the availability and the actual
acquisition 3 3 of small arms unquestionably contribute to the intensifi-
cation of warfare and criminality.3 4 They contend that "[i] t is not only
the availability of arms [but] the arms themselves that condition vio-
lence. '3 5 Further, some argue that arms-manufacturing governments
and firms "disseminat[e] .. .a deliberately fabricated culture of mis-
trust and confrontation, [engage in] direct 'market-creation' activi-
ties ... [and] conspire to cultivate a demand for weapons. .... "136
This thesis has significant implications for the international
SALW trade. As defense sector budgets decrease in the wake of the
Cold War, arms surpluses are "dumped" at extremely low prices into
war zones, creating a buyer's market.3 7 For example, "an AK47 com-
plete with a couple of clips of ammunition can be bought for less than
$15.00, or for a bag of maize."38 The widespread availability of inex-
31 See id at 167 ("The illicit trade accounts for 10-20 percent of the total trade in small
arms but [it] is the prime culprit in fuelling crime, civil conflict, and corruption.").
32 Id. at 202. For a more detailed discussion of the accessibility thesis and its implica-
tions, see id. at 202-05.
33 See id. at 204 ("Availability . .. is distinct from 'acquisition'-where the triggering
effect of increased transfers on conflict outbreak is more clearly defined. But the two
elements-availability and acquisition-frequently overlap.") (footnote omitted).
34 See id. at 204-05.
35 Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
36 PAUL CORNISH, CONTROLLING THE ARMS TRADE: THE WEST VERSUS THE REST 11
(1996).
37 See SMALL ARMS SURvEY, supra note 10, at 97 ("[T]he ready availability of massive
surplus arms stocks from the West and the former Soviet bloc, together with new produc-
tion, has created a flourishing 'buyer's market... .'"); see also CORNISH, supra note 36, at 3
("With huge excesses in supply combined with declining demand, it is also a market in
which much of the initiative has shifted to the buyer."); PIRSEYEDI, supra note 12, at 8.
38 DISARMAMENT, supra note 9, at 9; see also SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 17
(same); Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the Expert of the Secretary
General, Graia Machel, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 27, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (1996) [herein-
after Machel Report] ("[A] n AK-47 automatic machine gun can be purchased for the cost of




pensive weapons like these tend to fuel conflicts, 39 as countries have a
multitude of suppliers and weaponry from which to choose. 40
Opponents of the accessibility thesis oversimplify the problem by
arguing that people, not guns, kill. 4 1 Additionally, they note that gun
legislation tends to create economies of scale in the weapons manufac-
turing industry, which serves as a catalyst to surplus production and
unintentional diffusion.42 Other researchers argue that accessibility
to arms improves self-protection, which may even aid in "reduc[ing]
mortality and morbidity."43 They further point out that because coun-
tries have an interest in self-defense, stemming the flow of arms ex-
ports would only result in buyers going elsewhere. 44 In other words,
"if we don't export, others will." 45 This argument finds support in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which establishes a state's
right "to defend itself and . . . to decide for itself what, and from
whom, to buy in the arms market ... "46 Therefore, opponents of the
accessibility thesis reason, "[w] hy . . . should jobs, foreign earnings,
and an important sector of national industrial life, be sacrificed to
some vague and pious idea of self-restraint . . . ?",47 Even if the few
Western suppliers who dominate the market were to exercise self-re-
straint, the effect would be limited since a significant portion of the
international market is outside of their control.48
2. Contextualizing the Issue: U.S. Gun Litigation
a. The U.S. Gun Lobby: A Look at the National Rifle Association
(NRA) and Its Opponents
While the current debate in American politics and jurisprudence
regarding gun litigation may not be directly relevant to a suit against
39 See generally CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARMS TRADE, supra note 16, at 81-97 (describing the
role of arms in fueling violent conflicts); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT/AFRICA,
ANGOLA: ARMS TRADE AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR SINCE THE 1992 ELECTIONS
(1994) (documenting the role of arms in maintaining the rebel group UNITA's insurgency
against the Angolan government and citizenry).
40 See SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 16, 20-24 (listing the most notorious
producers and types of small arms).
41 See id. at 202.
42 Id.
43 See id.
44 See CORNISH, supra note 36, at 3-4.
45 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 Id. at 5; U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.... ."). But
see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 1 282 (June 27) (sepa-
rate opinion ofJudge Ago) (holding that any use of force in self-defense must be necessary
and proportionate to the impending and actual threat); Muna Ndulo, International Law
and the Use of Force: America's Response to September 11, 28 CORNELL L.F., Spring 2002, at 5, 6-7
(same).
47 CORNISH, supra note 36, at 19.
48 Id. at 45.
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gun manufacturers under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 49 it vividly illus-
trates the influence of gun manufacturers within the United States.
The domestic debate centers on individual responsibility and the
meaning of "the text and the original intent of the Second Amend-
ment [to] clearly protect the right of individuals to keep and bear
firearms."50 Supporters of gun litigation argue that it is proper to
hold manufacturers responsible as supervisors of retail gun sales be-
cause litigation forces them to install safety features that would render
the guns inoperable for unauthorized users. 51 Opponents respond
that lawsuits unjustly target gun manufacturers and serve as a road-
block to citizens exercising their constitutional right to bear arms or
their ability to acquire guns for self-defense. 52 According to the 131-
year old National Rifle Association, "[t]he very notion of trying to
hold a lawful industry responsible for a criminal's actions defies
logic [. ] ,,53
With over four million members, the NRA is the nation's largest
group lobbying state legislatures to pass immunity laws that would bar
cities and municipalities from suing gun manufacturers. 54 Currently,
thirty-one states have passed such laws. 55 The NRA asserts that the
gun industry is law-abiding and therefore should not be held responsi-
ble for the actions of third parties. 56 Moreover, the NRA views such
litigation as a means for "anti-gun extremists" to drive gun manufac-
turers into bankruptcy.
57
49 The impediments to suits against gun manufacturers in the United States under
state tort law will not similarly impede a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act; a court will
apply the substantive law that provides a remedy for international wrongs. See infra Part
III.C.2.a.
50 Letter from Bill Pryor, Alabama State Attorney General, to John Ashcroft, United
States Attorney General (July 8, 2002) [hereinafter Letter to John Ashcroft] (internal quo-
tation marks omitted), available at http://www.nraila.org/media/misc/pryorlet.PDF5. The
Second Amendment reads, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S.
CONST. amend. II. But see Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that the Second Amendment "does not confer an individual right to [actually] own or
possess" guns).
51 See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institu-
tional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (2000).
52 See id.; News Release, National Rifle Association, NRA Applauds Mississippi for Pass-
ing Lawsuit Preemption (Dec. 3, 2002) [hereinafter NRA Preemption Law], available at
http://www.nraila.org/News/Read/Releases.aspx?ID=2152.
53 See NRA Preemption Law, supra note 52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 See id.; see also Lawsuit Preemption Remains Top Priority, 10 NRA-ILA GRASSROOTS
ALERT (Jan. 24, 2003) [hereinafter GRASSROOTS ALERT] ("[O]ne of [the] NRA's top priori-
ties during this congressional session will be the passage of federal legislation that will
prohibit these junk lawsuits."), available at http://www.nraila.org/CurrentLegislation/Ac-
tionAlerts/Read.aspx?ID=148.





Many legal academics support this position and argue that using
litigation to regulate the gun industry destroys sound tort principles
that "manufacturers are usually not responsible for criminal misuse of
their products. '5 8 Others, however, counter that courts must impose
a duty on gun makers to stop marketing guns to criminal elements or
unauthorized users. 59 Still others argue that tort law complements
legislative efforts to regulate the gun manufacturing industry.60 This
narrow argument claims that civil suits, which target marketing and
sales practices resulting in increased criminal use of guns, will make
the firearm industry more responsible and ultimately reduce gun
violence.
61
b. Status of Municipal Lawsuits Against Gun Manufacturers
As of 2001, courts dismissed nine of the twenty-three lawsuits
against the firearms industry filed by thirty-two municipalities and one
state Attorney General. 62 The primary challenge plaintiffs faced was
demonstrating that manufacturers actually knew "how their guns were
channeled toward illegal uses," and whether there was any "indication
that they could have stopped the trafficking."63 However, new infor-
mation from an industry insider indicates that gun manufacturers
knowingly maintained distribution systems and permitted guns to fall
into the hands of unauthorized individuals such as children and
criminals. 64 Robert A. Ricker, former chief lobbyist and executive di-
rector of the American Shooting Sports Council, underscored the fire-
arms manufacturers' encouragement and reward of illegal activity by
58 See H. Sterling Burnett, Suing Gun Manufacturers: Hazardous to Our Health, 5 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 433, 467 (2001). The concern is that there will be a domino effect-if tort
principles are "completely discarded, the courts will be crushed under a tide of new law-
suits and it will not be long before the extremists among us try to use the law to shut
industrial civilization down." Id.
59 See Amy Edwards, Notes & Comments, Mail-Order Gun Kits and Fingerprint-Resistant
Pistols: Why Washington Courts Should Impose a Duty on Gun Manufacturers to Market Firearms
Responsibly, 75 WASH. L. Rv. 941, 943 (2000).
60 Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries:
Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 Mo. L. REv. 1,
5 (2000).
61 Id. This position cites as an example the role of the tort system in regulating the
automotive industry. "While automobile design specifications are regulated [by a federal
administrative agency], liability exposure for manufacturing, warning, and design defects
provides a powerful incentive for manufacturers to adhere not merely to published regula-
tions but to ensure that their car designs provide an optimal mix of safety and effective-
ness." Id. at 62.
62 See Updates in Municipal Litigation, at http://www.firearmslitigation.org/con-
tent/newsletter/news_2001 voll5.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
63 William Glaberson, Gun Strategists Are Watching Brooklyn Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2002, at B1.
64 See Fox Butterfield, Gun Industry Ex-Official Describes Bond of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
4, 2003, at A14.
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corrupt dealers and distributors, and admitted that manufacturers
place lawful, conscientious dealers at a disadvantage:
The firearms industry ... has long known that the diversion of fire-
arms from legal channels of commerce to the illegal black mar-
ket ... occurs principally at the distributor/dealer level. Many of
those firearms pass quickly from licensed dealers to juveniles and
criminals ... to gun traffickers.., by corrupt dealers or distributors
who go to great lengths to avoid detection by law enforcement au-
thorities. [The] industry [has] long known that greater ... action
to prevent illegal transactions is possible and would curb the supply
of firearms to the illegal market. However, until faced with a serious
threat of civil liability for past conduct, [they] have consistently re-
sisted taking constructive voluntary action to prevent firearms from
ending up in the illegal gun market and have sought to silence
others within the industry who advocated reform.
6 5
Ricker's detailed comments prove what advocates of stricter gun regu-
lations have consistently argued: that gun manufacturers are complicit
in the illegal sale and use of weapons.
3. The Unregulated SALW Market: A Prescription for Abuse
Currently, no international treaties or laws address small arms
and light weapons proliferation. "[I] llicit transfers of small arms cur-
rently operate in favourable (i.e. legally lax) domestic and interna-
tional environments." 6 6 Many of the regulations in place are nation-
specific, without international coordination. 67 Indeed, very few na-
tional laws specifically address the issue of arms brokering. 68 In a sur-
vey of twenty-eight countries with national arms control systems, only
seven had legislation directly regulating arms dealers, while another
eight did so indirectly. 69 Even in those countries with such systems,
65 Decl. of Robert A. Ricker in Support of Pls.' Opp'n to Def. Manufacturers' Mot. for
Summ. J. at 4-5, People v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc., No. 4095, 2003 WL 21184117
(Cal. Super. Ct. 2003) [hereinafter Ricker's Declaration], available at http://www.cbc.ca/
disclosure/archives/030218_guns/documents/rickeraffadavit.pdf. In one case, plaintiffs
successfully established that "manufacturers and distributors . . . can . . . substantially re-
duce the number of firearms leaking into the illegal secondary market and ultimately into
the hands of criminals. . . ." N.A.A.C.P. v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449-50
(E.D.N.Y. 2003), dismissed on other grounds.
66 SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 123; see also DISARMAMENT, supra note 9, at xvi
(noting international forces that have led to SALW proliferation in southern Africa).
67 See generally SMALL ARMs SURvEY, supra note 10, at 123-26 (outlining various na-
tional approaches to the problem of illegal arms transfers).
68 See id. at 125.
69 See id. at 124. The United States has a comprehensive law on arms brokering,
which amended the Arms Export Control Act. Id. at 125. The law now permits U.S. citi-
zens, any foreign national residing in the United States, or anyone subject to U.S. jurisdic-
tion to obtain brokering authorization. Id. As of 2001, the United States had registered
and authorized 137 brokers to facilitate arms transfers outside the United States, and had
granted 200 licenses for arms deals. Id. at 134 n.56.
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arms transfers still occur through loopholes in the law, avoidance of
the nation's jurisdictional reach by routing the transfer through a
third country, and limited enforcement of the laws.70 In addition, the
relatively few international initiatives that exist do not adequately ad-
dress the SALW proliferation problem.
71
a. Non-Transparency in the SALW Trade
The limited legal infrastructure currenfly in place is undermined
by a lack of transparency in the international arms trade. 72 The crux
of this problem is that the original sources of the weapons-the pro-
ducers who contravene U.N. Security Council embargoes-remain
unknown. 73 Indeed, "[t]he secrecy surrounding illicit arms transfers
often makes it difficult to identify the actors involved and the services
they provide." 74 This secrecy also undermines the ability to identify,
trace, freeze and confiscate the financial assets-"the heart of all crim-
inal enterprise"-of those involved. 75
The non-transparency problem is further exacerbated by a lack of
monitoring controls that could trace weapons from manufacturer to
end user. The AK-47 assault rifle, while originally a Russian design, is
so widely produced in various forms by many countries that "a thor-
ough study of model numbers, serial numbers and factory markings
would be required in order to determine their precise origin."76 Al-
though many weapons bought on the open market are second- or
third-hand purchases, such monitoring would assist in ascertaining
the sale, supply and trail of weapons.
77
b. The Role of International Financial Institutions
The transparency problems involved with small arms and light
weapons proliferation exist in tandem with other illicit international
activities.78 Because "[f] inancial non-transparency... facilitate [s] ...
70 See id. at 125-26; discussion infra Part I.C.
71 See SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 127-29. The primary intent of this Note is
to bridge this gap in the regulation of small arms and light weapons, and argue that legal
accountability for gun manufacturers is the first step toward addressing this problem. See
discussion infra Part IV.
72 See id. at 126.
73 See UN Panel of Experts, supra note 13, 1 167-76.
74 SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 98.
75 See UN Panel of Experts, supra note 13, 246.
76 Id. 1 177.
77 See id.
78 While this Note specifically discusses the SALW proliferation issue, it is extremely
important to recognize that this issue does not exist in a vacuum. SALW proliferation
persists in an interconnected environment with other illegal contraband, such as traffick-
ing in diamonds, timber, drugs, and oil, and money laundering. See, e.g., UN Panel of Ex-
perts, supra note 13 (discussing the relationship between conflict, illicit arms, diamonds,
and money laundering in Sierra Leone).
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many of the world's more significant social ills, including civil war and
civic instability," 79 any discussion of SALW proliferation must recog-
nize the critical role of international financial institutions.
Noting that the main thrust of civil war is more about "en-
gag[ing] in profitable crime under cover of warfare" than winning
wars,80 one commentator explains that financial institutions that per-
mit the anonymous transfer of funds into anonymous accounts fuel
conflict and illegal activities. 8 1 In addition, gaps in the international
financial regulatory system further destabilize national supervision
and enforcement measures.8 2 The existing global financial infrastruc-
ture consists of "(a) small international business companies or trusts,
established in jurisdictions of convenience, which establish (b) bank
accounts at local financial institutions, which have correspondent
banking relationships with (c) major international financial institu-
tions, which (d) move funds willy-nilly throughout the world without
regard to the provenance of the funds."
8 3
Thus, the best means of reducing illicit activities has been to es-
tablish accountability and traceability standards for international fi-
nancial institutions.8 4 Dubbed "know your customer," these standards
mandate that "[a] t the front end, bankers and other financial [institu-
tions must] know with whom they are dealing, and . . . what [their]
customers have been doing with their money."8 5 On the back end,
when customers withdraw funds financial institutions must be cogni-
zant of both the money's origin and who is receiving it.86 Similar stan-
dards must be established for financial institutions involved with the
79 Jonathan M. Winer, Combating Global Conflict by Promoting Financial Trans-
parency: The Utility of a Global White List, Paper presented at the International Peace
Academy, Program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Rockefeller Foundation Study and
Conference Center, Bellagio, Italy, May 20-24, 2002, at 2 (on file with The Cornell Law
Review). For instance, money laundering is an essential element of the illicit diamond
trade, which in turn fuels civil conflicts. Id.
80 Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 See id. at 6 ("[A]ccess to the international financial services infrastructure by re-
gions and institutions that have no controls on placement remains a major vulnerability to
terrorism."); id. at 9-20 (outlining the impact of globalized illicit financing on political
stability, areas of conflict and terrorism).
82 See id. at 3. These gaps include: "[firagmented supervision," "[e]xploitation of dif-
ferences among national laws [used] to . .. circumvent more stringent national laws and
international standards," "[s]ecrecy laws which impede the sharing of information,"
"[i]nadequate attention to electronic payments in existing anti-money laundering supervi-
sion and enforcement," "lack of international standards governing key mechanisms used in
transnational financial transactions," and "[m]inimal due diligence by company formation
agents, attorneys, and financial institutions." Id.
83 Id. at 9. (listing fifteen international financial institutions, including Citibank, J.P.
Morgan-Chase, the Bank of New York, and Credit Lyonnais, that have been involved in
money laundering).





SALW trade to encourage gun manufacturers to make best efforts in
monitoring with whom they do business.
C. The Players in the SALW Trade
The lack of adequate transparency and robust regulatory systems
in both the SALW trade and international financial transactions fos-
ters an intercontinental criminal web comprised of nefarious actors
engaged in the type of intrigue and deception usually relegated to a
John Le Carr6 novel.8 7 SALWs are obtained directly from weapon
producing countries or from the excess stocks of national armed
forces.88 The typical movement of arms entails cross-border ship-
ments and country stop-overs, and it involves the assistance of customs
inspectors, licensing governments, weapons flights, and even heads of
state.89
1. The Legal Sale
In a recent U.N. Panel of Experts case study on Sierra Leone, 90
inspectors discovered that " [v] irtually all of the weapons shipped into
RUF [Revolutionary United Front] territory are trans-shipped
through at least two other countries ... ."91 As one example, the
study cites a 68-ton shipment of Ukrainian weapons to the RUF in
Sierra Leone via Burkina Faso.92 Ukrainian documents showed that a
Gibraltar-based company representing the Ministry of Defence of
Burkina Faso, and a Ukrainian state-owned company, Ukrspetsexport,
contracted for the weapons. 93 Moreover, Air Foyle, a British aircraft
company acting as agent for the Ukrainian air carrier, was under con-
tract to ship the weapons via a Gibraltar-based chartering company. 94
After the Minister of Defense in Burkina Faso issued Ukrspetsexport
87 Although fictional, Le Carr6 wrote a gripping, realistic post-Cold War thriller on
arms dealers. SeeJOHN LE CARRe, THE NIGHT MANAGER (1993).
88 See UN Panel of Experts, supra note 13, 194.
89 See id. 195-97; SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 123 ("[A]rms transport net-
works will always cohere on the fringes of armed conflicts... channeling material support
from external governments and actors.").
90 For a brief summary of the nine-year civil war in Sierra Leone, see Marissa Miraldi,
Overcoming Obstacles of Justice: The Special Court of Sierra Leone, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
849, 849-52; United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL-Back-
ground [hereinafter UNAMSIL Background], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
91 UN Panel of Experts, supra note 13, 202.
92 See id. 203-11; see also SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 122-23 (noting that
the consignment was for "3,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles, 50 machine guns, 25 RPG
launchers, five Strela-3 surface-to-air missile systems, and five Metis ATGW systems, plus
ammunition for them ....").
93 See UN Panel of Experts, supra note 13, 204.
94 See id.; see also SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 122 (documenting a prior arms
shipment by the Air Foyle company).
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an end-user certificate authorizing the Gibraltar-based company to
purchase the weapons on behalf of Burkina Faso, the Ukraine li-
censed the sale.
9 5
2. The Illegal Transfer, The Paymaster and The Wealthy
Businessmen
Burkina Faso, certified as both the end-user and the place of final
destination, denies U.N. evidence indicating that the weapons were
re-exported to a third country.96 The U.N. investigation revealed that
some weapons were offloaded in Burkina Faso's capital, Oua-
gadougou, others were trucked to the Western Burkina Faso city of
Bobo Dioulasso, and the remaining weapons made their way to
Liberia. 9
7
The fact that these weapons found their way to Liberia is signifi-
cant because Charles Taylor, Liberia's then-president and former U.S.
prison escapee, was closely involved in fueling the Sierra Leonean
conflict.98 One of his business partners and primary confidant was an
internationally wanted Israeli named Leonid Minin;99 it was Minin's
BAC-111 that flew the weapons to Sierra Leone. 100 Three days after
the Ukrainian weapons arrived, Taylor's private presidential jet flew
into Ouagadougou, where weapons were loaded on board and flown
back to Liberia. 10 1 In all, this process was repeated three times, and
an additional three flights were made into Bobo Dioulasso to pick up
the weapons located there. 10 2
Every individual involved in this weapons trafficking scheme had
to be compensated to ensure their compliance. In the Sierra Leone
example, the paymaster was Tatal El-Ndine, a wealthy businessman
from Lebanon.10 3 El-Ndine pays "Liberians fighting in Sierra Leone
95 See UN Panel of Experts, supra note 13, 205.
96 See id. 206.
97 Id. 207.
98 See id. 212; see also SatmAL ARms SURVEY, supra note 10, at 120 ("[T]he President of
Liberia, Charles Taylor, has provided critical support to the RUF in terms of arms and
other materiel . .. while retaining up to 90 per cent of the [RUF's] diamond profits.").
After being indicted for war crimes in June 2003, Taylor found asylum in Nigeria and on
August 11, 2003, stepped down as president. See Charles Taylor: A Wanted Man, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/06/10/liberia.taylor/index.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2004).
99 See UN Panel of Experts, supra note 13, 7 208. Minin "is identified in the police
records of several countries and has a history of involvement in criminal activities ranging
from east European organized crime, trafficking in stolen works of art, illegal possession of
firearms, arms trafficking and money laundering." Id.
100 See id. The aircraft was registered in the Cayman Islands but operated by a Monaco-
based company, LIMAD. See id.
101 Id. 209.
102 See id. This number of flights was necessary because the plane had limited cargo
capacity. Id.
103 See id. 7 23, 214.
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alongside the RUF, and those bringing diamonds out of Sierra Leone"
personally. 10 4 He also brings "foreign businessmen and investors to
Liberia... who are willing to cooperate with the regime in legitimate
business activities [including dealings] in weapons and illicit
diamonds." 10 5 Many of these businessmen operate internationally,
obtaining their weapons primarily from Eastern Europe.
10 6
While the Burkina Faso weapons shipment strongly illustrates the
interplay of legal and illegal arms transfers and the multifarious actors
involved, its main significance is in confirming the role of small arms
and light weapons in sustaining conflict. An earlier shipment, made
in December 1998, precipitated the Burkina Faso one. 10 7 Minin's
BAC-111 flew twice from Niamey Airport in Niger to Liberia,108 and
on the second trip weapons that may have come from the Nigerian
armed forces' existing stockpiles were flown to Liberia and of-
floaded.10 9 Just days later, "the RUF rebels started a major offensive
that eventually resulted in [a] destructive January 1999 raid on Free-
town [, Sierra Leone]."1"0
The Sierra Leone case study highlights the role and interactions
of several players in the SALW trade, and reveals that the legal com-
mencement of illicit arms transfers can nonetheless be "diverted to
unauthorized end-users or ... used for abuses that constitute serious
international crimes.11' This Note argues that the ultimate conse-
quences of transactions like these are foreseeable, and even intended,
by SALW manufacturers when they sell guns in reckless disregard of
current political and economic situations.
112
II
WAR Is NOT CHILD'S PLAY: THE ISSUE OF CHILD SOLDIERS
"It is immoral that adults should want children to fight their wars for
them... There is simply no excuse, no acceptable argument
for arming children."









111 SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 129.
112 See id.
113 See University of Essex, Children and Armed Conflict Unit, Child Soldiers: Issues &
Themes, available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/themes/child_soldiers/default.htm
(last visited Feb. 28,, 2004).
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While an estimated 300,000 children engage in military conflict
in 40 countries, 1 4 "paramilitary organizations, guerrilla groups, and
civil militias" conscript about another 500,000 in over 85 countries.
115
As young as ten, children are used in all aspects of military life.
116
They serve as frontline troops," 17 sex slaves,'1 8 porters, cooks, spies, 19
and perform "life-threatening tasks such as planting land mines."'
120
Children are attractive combatants because they are "more obedient,
do not question orders and are easier to manipulate than adult
soldiers." 21 Moreover, children usually do not demand pay.
Recruitment of children has a direct correlation to enduring con-
flict. 12 2 The "shortage of manpower, due to increasing casualties and
escalation of the conflict, leads to an ever more desperate search for
fresh recruits to fill the ranks."1 23 Specifically, children are recruited
in three different ways: forcibly, via conscription, and voluntarily.
124
114 Cris R. Revaz, The Optional Protocols to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on
Sex Trafficking and Child Soldiers, in CENTER FOR HuMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW,
HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Fall 2001,'at 13, 15.
115 See id.; see also Amy Beth Abbott, Note, Child Soldiers-The Use of Children as Instru-
ments of War, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 499, 507 ("Child units currently serve both
state and non-state forces in international and internal conflicts around the world.").
116 See Machel Report, supra note 38, 44-48 (describing the variety of tasks to which
child soldiers are assigned); id. 115 ("In Cambodia, a survey of [landmine] victims in
military hospitals found that 43 per cent of them had been recruited between the ages of
[ten] and [sixteen]."); see also discussion infra Part II.A (exploring the debate over the age
of child soldiers).
117 See Abbott, supra note 115, at 507-08 ("[C] ommanders capitalize on a child's fear-
lessness by sending child troops to serve as advance forces in ambush attacks and in suicide
bombings."). America's war on terrorism has brought U.S. troops face-to-face with child
soldiers. See Mike Barber, A Growing Concern: Child Soldiers Never Know What They Die For,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 8, 2002, at Al (noting that a 14-year-old boy with an AK-
47 assault rifle shot and killed the first American soldier to die in Afghanistan).
118 See Machel Report, supra note 38, 46 (reporting the experiences of a 13-year-old girl
from Honduras, who was "obliged to have sexual relations 'to alleviate the sadness of the
combatants.' . . . At [her] young age [she] experienced abortion.").
119 Id. 34; Rachel Stohl, Remembering the Smallest Veterans, 43 WEEKLY DEFENSE MONI-
TOR, Nov. 4, 1999, at http://www.cdi.org/weekly/1999/issue43.html#2 (last visited Apr. 17,
2004).
120 JEREMY ROSENBLATr, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AFFECTING CHILDREN 259 (2000).
121 Machel Report, supra note 38, 1 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
122 See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, The Use of Children As Soldiers: A




124 See UNESCO INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION, HUMAN PROFILE CASES: WHO ARE CHILD &
YOUNG ADULT SOLDIERS? [hereinafter UNESCO REPORT] (noting that "[c]onscription is
the legal obligation of citizens . . . to serve in the military," while "[f]orced recruitment
is . . . a response to an immediate shortfall of manpower, either because a conflict or an
opposition group is unpopular or because of a high rate of migratory labor," and
"[v]oluntary recruitment is... the.., conscious choice to volunteer for armed service"), at
http://www.ginie.org/ginie-crises-links/childsoldiers/human.html, (last visited Feb. 28,
2004). This Note uses "conscription" and "forced recruitment" interchangeably, as chil-
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Often children are "press-ganged" under the threat of violence or ab-
duction to participate in combat. 125 In Sierra Leone, the RUF rebels
forced children to slaughter neighboring villages and to witness-and
sometimes even partake in-the execution of their own immediate
family members.126 Additionally, "children . . . who were reluctant,
hesitant or refused to fight and train were executed.., on the spot.
This tactic was used a great deal [to recruit] additional [child]
soldiers." 127 Finally, a number of children were given hard drugs to
bolster their courage and dull their sensitivity to pain. 128
The use of the term "voluntary" in reference to the enlistment of
child soldiers is questionable, given the horrific conditions that moti-
vate children to join armed forces. 129 Survival is one of the primary
factors influencing volunteerism.130 As one scholar notes, "[o]ne of
the most basic reasons that children join armed groups is economic.
Hunger and poverty may drive parents to offer their children for ser-
dren are left without a choice in joining armed conflict in both cases. See also ILENE COHN
& Guy S. GooDWIN-GILL, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT
13-43 (1994) (outlining the reasons and ways children become involved in military
forces).
125 Machel Report, supranote 38, 36; see also Abbott, supra note 115, at 513 (noting that
child soldier "enrollment in governmental armed forces and opposition groups often re-
sults from abduction, coercion or manipulation").
126 See E-mail from Alan W. White, Ph.D., Chief of Investigations, Special Court for
Sierra Leone, to Nancy Morisseau, J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School (Dec. 24, 2002,
03:46:54 PST) (on file with the Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter White E-mail]; see also
COHN & GOODwIN-GILL, supra note 124, at 27, noting that
A typical ... recruitment practice involved taking a boy soldier back to his
village and forcing him to kill someone known to him ... in such a way that
the community knew that he had killed, thus effectively closing the door to
the child ever returning to his village.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The result was that the child became dependent on
his captors and sometimes even came to "identify with their cause." Id.
127 White E-mail, supra note 126; see also Abbott, supra note 115, at 515 ("Once a child
combatant escapes, the guerrilla groups deem the child a deserter, subjecting the child to
on-the-spot execution if found.").
128 See Machel Report, supra note 38, 47; see also White E-mail, supra note 126 ("The
children would be drugged by slicing their temple and putting cocaine directly into their
bloodstream and the children would go on killing sprees for up to 72 hours or until the
drug wore off, killing innocent civilians in villages.").
129 See A Growing Phenomenon, supra note 122 ("[A] broad interpretation of the term
'volunteer' [is needed] as brutal circumstance leaves little room for genuine choice."); see
also Abbott, supra note 115, at 517 ("In any war-torn nation, a child's motivation to become
a soldier lies in the roots of the conflict that have come to define the child's life; therefore,
one needs to look critically at whether the child did indeed have freedom of choice in his
or her decision to volunteer.").
130 Many of the children who join armed forces tend to be "at risk" youth. See
UNESCO REPORT, supra note 124 ("Regardless of age, gender, or how they are recruited,
child soldiers disproportionately come from the poor and marginalized segments of soci-
ety, isolated rural areas, the conflict zones themselves, and from disrupted or non-existent
family backgrounds.") In the case of volunteerism, "[I]ack of education is the primary
hallmark of the youth [who] volunteer. . . ." Id. Another "uniquely disadvantaged sub-
group are the inhabitants of refugee camps or internally displaced persons." Id.
1280
2004] CHILD SOLDIERS SUING GUN MANUFACTURERS 1281
vice .... [c] hildren themselves may volunteer if they believe that this
is the only way to guarantee regular meals, clothing or medical atten-
tion." 31 Moreover, families are often threatened with violence or
property confiscation if they do not contribute a son to the "cause."'
13 2
It is doubtful, however, that a young child has the intellectual
aptitude to evaluate and examine Delphic concepts like ideology or
nation.13 3 Thus, Article 12 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC) 134 considers a child's age and maturity
in requiring that only a child with the capacity to form his or her own
opinions has the right to express them. 135 Whatever the means of re-
cruitment, children simply do not belong in warfare, and thus their
enlistment must end.
136
A. The Age Controversy: How Old is a Child?
In any discussion of policy affecting children, there must be an
examination of the age at which one moves from childhood to adult-
hood. 13 7 The age classification of a child is critical in determining
131 Machel Report, supra note 38, 39; see COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 124, at 23
("[O]ften a gun is meal-ticket and a more attractive option than sitting at home afraid and
helpless."); A Growing Phenomenon, supra note 122 (citing a UN report which showed that
"the single major factor of ... volunteering is ill-treatment of themselves or their families
by government troops.").
132 COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 124, at 29.
133 See id. at 35-36.
134 U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989) [hereinafter
CRC].
135 See id. at 168.
136 This Note argues that child soldiers are as much victims of armed conflict as those
they harm. Therefore, they should not be criminally prosecuted for their actions because
they performed them under duress and coercion. See generally Amnesty International, Child
Soldiers: Criminals or Victims? (Dec. 22, 2000) (
In a situation where crimes have been committed by children, particularly
when they have been terrorized and [brutalized] into submission, complex
questions about their criminal responsibility are raised ....
Amnesty International considers that the focus and priority should be on
prosecuting those who committed crimes against children, particularly the
crime of recruiting children who are under 15.
), available at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/IOR500022000?OpenDocument&of=
THEMES/CHIL.
137 This requires a discussion of the cultural, legal, and institutional definitions of a
child, as each definition has different needs that lead to different age requirements. See
COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 124, at 7 ("The 'age of majority' is a social, religious,
cultural or legal device by which societies acknowledge the transition to adulthood; and
there is no necessary correlation between any of the levels."); see also Madeleine Grey Bul-
lard, Child Labor Prohibitions Are Universal, Binding, and Obligatory Law: The Evolving State of
Customary International Law Concerning the Unempowered Child Laborer, 24 Hous. J. INT'L L.
139, 163-64 (2001) (discussing the International Labor Organization's Minimum Age
Convention which established "not less than 15 years and not less than the age of comple-
tion of compulsory schooling" as the minimum age to enter into the workforce). But see
Krjn Peters, Children as Perpetrators of Atrocities, in CHILDREN IN EXTREME SITUATIONS: PRO-
CEEDINGS FROM THE 1998 ALISTAIR BERKLEY MEMORIAL LECTURE at 88, 89 (Dev. Studies Inst.,
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who is entitled to the special status of a child under international hu-
manitarian law. 138 While one may argue that a universal definition of
"childhood" is rigid and overly simplistic, a coherent approach is not
only long overdue, 139 but it has serious implications for those who
may participate in armed conflict. In other words, "the higher the age
bracket, the higher the ceiling, the more children we can protect.
The lower the ceiling, the fewer children we can protect."140
The CRC defines the term child to mean "every human being
below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the
child, majority is attained earlier.'' 1 4 1 Signed and ratified by every na-
tion but the United States and Somalia, 142 the significance of this defi-
nition is that the internationally recognized age of maturity, by which
the majority of countries set their legal voting age, is eighteen. 43 This
definition, however, pertains only to the child as a civilian, not as a
child combatant. 144 Article 38(2) of the CRC and Article 77(2) of the
1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions declare the legal age for
recruitment and participation in armed conflict to be fifteen. 145
There is near-unanimous consensus within the international com-
munity that the miritmum age for recruitment and participation in
armed forces should be eighteen. 146 In May 2000, the United Nations
adopted an Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Chil-
London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., Working Paper Series No. 00-05 2000) (arguing that
children are not always victims of wars, and that they often join armed insurgency with
their eyes wide open).
138 See ROSENBLATT, supra note 120, at 259 ("[P]ursuant to the Declaration on the
Rights of the Child 1924, 'mankind owes to the child the best it has to give' . . . .").
139 INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON CHILDREN XIX (Geraldine Van Bueren ed., 1993).
140 See Olara Otunnu, The Convention and Children in Situations of Armed Conflict, in CHIL-
DREN IN EXTREME SITUATIONS: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE 1998 ALISTAIR BERKLEY MEMORIAL
LECTURE, supra note 137, at 51, 60.
141 CRC, supra note 134, at 167.
142 See Bullard, supra note 137, at 162 n.153.
143 Abbott, supra note 115, at 527.
144 See ROSENBLATT, supra note 120, at 259; see also infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the inter-
national law governing child civilians and child soldiers).
145 CRC, supra note 134, at 171; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I),June 8, 1977, art. 77(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
146 See, e.g., COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 124, at 3 (citing the "general agree-
ment among the participants" at a 1991 Conference on Children of War organized by,
among others, the Swedish Red Cross); cf Dominguez v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 913, I 85-87, OEA/ser. L/V/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2002) (holding that an
international consensus has determined the age of a child to be less than 18 and thus it is
now a jus cogens norm). But see Jenny Kuper, Children in Armed Conflict: The Law and Its Uses,
in CHILDREN IN EXTREME SITUATIONS: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE 1998 ALISTAIR BERKLEY MEMO-
RIAL LECTURE, supra note 137, at 41, 48 (asking whether "such widespread ratification [of
agreements like the CRC has] any real significance, especially when . . . countries enter
sweeping reservations . . . that render their ratification of it almost meaningless").
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dren in Armed Conflicts (Child Soldiers Protocol). 147 This ground-
breaking piece of international legislation outlaws the use of children
under the age of eighteen in armed conflict, with the exception that
sixteen- and seventeen-year olds may voluntarily join a nation's armed
forces. '
48
The United States was the strongest opponent of raising the mini-
mum age for child participation in armed conflict to eighteen.
1 49 Al-
though comprising less than one-half of one percent of their armed
forces, the United States's practice of recruiting seventeen-year olds,
and the sheer number of Junior ROTC programs operating in high
schools throughout the country, 150 would directly violate such an age
restriction. In addition, conservatives in Congress questioned the con-
vention's stance of taking children's views into account. 151 They ar-
gued that considering children's views undermines parental authority,
provides children with a cause of action against their parents, and em-
powers U.N. bureaucrats to "in effect, tak[e] over family life."
152
American opponents of the treaty also expressed concern about im-
pairing the United States's ability to deploy its seventeen-year-old
recruits.1
53
However, facing international and domestic pressure, the United
States government changed its policy. 154 While the United States was
147 G.A. Res. 263, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 116(a), Annex I, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/54/263 (2001) [hereinafter Child Soldiers Protocol]. The other Optional
Protocol is on the Rights of the Child, on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and
Child Pornography. See id. Annex II, at 7. The Protocols were "signed by 96 countries and
ratified by 14." International Treaty Bans Use of Child Soldiers, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 12,
2002, at 2A. It is important to note that while both protocols are related to the 1989 CRC,
they are independent of it. Rachel Stohl, Senate Holds Hearing on Child Soldiers Treaty, 6
WEEKLY DEFENSE MONITOR, Mar. 28, 2002, at http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2002/issue07.
html (last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
148 See Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 147, at art. 3 (raising the minimum age for
voluntary recruitment to sixteen); see also Revaz, supra note 114, at 16 (citing CRC Article
38(3)).
149 See Revaz, supra note 114, at 16; Stohl, supra note 147.
150 See A Growing Phenomenon, supra note 122; Abbott, supra note 115, at 530 ("IT]he
U.S. Government recognizes that in order to sign the CRC all fifty states must harmonize
their laws relating to children."); see also Center for Defense Information, Children &
Armed Conflict Project, Facts About Child Soldiers ("The Pentagon sponsors JROTC pro-
grams for approximately 400,000 high school boys and girls, where children are taught to
march, shoot, act, and think like soldiers."), available at http://www.cdi.org/atp/Child-
Soldiers/facts.html (Dec. 1, 1998).
151 See Oh, and Somalia Too, THE ECONOMIST, May 4, 2002, at 32, 32 [hereinafter Somalia
Too].
152 Id.
153 University of Essex, Clinton Hailed for Signing Ban on Child Combatants (July 5, 2000),
available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/Issues/Texts/SoldiersOO9.htm (July 5,
2000).
154 See Revaz, supra note 114, at 16 (noting that the American Bar Association "adopted
policy statements urging the United States to expeditiously ratify both Protocols.").
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a signatory, 55 President Clinton did not agree to support eighteen as
the minimum age requirement for military service until early 2000.156
In March 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee finally held
hearings on ratifying the Child Soldiers Protocol. 157
Unfortunately, the willingness of the United States to support the
Child Soldiers Protocol did not alter its domestic position. Noting
that the protocol does not adversely affect any of the U.S. armed
forces' recruiting programs, retired Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll,
Jr. testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the
"Department of Defense [m]ilitary training programs can legally be-
gin for children as young as 13 years of age and recruiting for active
service still begins [for those who are seventeen]. '"158 Moreover, he
emphasized that the "[seventeen]-year-old recruits who are available
for assignment to combat units number fewer than 200, or about one
tenth of one percent of the current 1,400,000 active duty force." 159
The U.S. armed forces' training and management procedures ensure
that this small number of recruits do not participate directly in armed
hostilities. 160 Nonetheless, the import of the United States's support
of the Child Soldiers Protocol solidifies eighteen as the minimum age
for participation in armed conflict under international law. 161
B. The Impact of SALW Proliferation
While SALW are not the "cause" of child soldier recruitment, the
proliferation of SALW and the protracted length of armed conflicts
155 The United States signed both protocols in 1995 but never sent them to Congress
for ratification. Somalia Too, supra note 151, at 32. However, one could argue that even
this act undermined the United States' opposition to raising the minimum age to eighteen.
A rule of international law is binding on all states except those that have "persistently
objected" to it. See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the
Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 457, 458 (1985) ("A state that has
persistently objected to a rule is not bound by it, so long as the objection was made mani-
fest during the process of the rule's emergence.") Thus, the argument advanced in favor
of eighteen as the minimum age emphasizes that the United States had not persistently
objected to the protocols. But seeJoRnANJ. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw AND LITIGA-
TION IN THE U.S. 97 (2000) (arguing that the persistent objector principle is "theoretically
unsound since customary international law rests upon general assent or general patterns of
expectation (not unanimous consent)").
156 See Revaz, supra note 114, at 16.
157 Stohl, supra note 147.
158 S. REP. No. 107-4, at 66 (2002).
159 Id. at 67.
160 Id. Moreover, the Department of Defense interprets the Child Soldiers Protocol's
requirement that a State take "all feasible measures" to ensure that a child does not partici-
pate in armed conflict to mean that it must prevent "immediate and actual action on the
battlefield that is likely to cause harm." See Stohl, supra note 147 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
161 Revaz, supra note 114, at 16. But see Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, July 17, 1998, art. 8(2) (b) (xxvi), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1008
(making the recruitment of children under age fifteen a war crime).
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does make the use of child combatants pragmatic.162 "[T]he in-
creased reliance on small arms and light weapons as the primary in-
strument of war . . . [has] made using children practical as these
weapons are easy for a small child to operate and repair."163 Moreo-
ver, "[t] he ubiquitous nature of [SALW] and their easy use have con-
tributed to the perpetration of violence by children and have been
used to force children to commit acts that sever their ties to their fam-
ilies and communities.' 1 64 At least in part because of SALW prolifera-
tion, an estimated two million children were killed in armed conflict
in the 1990s. 1 65 Those who survive often suffer severe psycho-social
trauma,' 66 and may "fall victim to preventable and treatable diseases
and conditions because of the lack of healthcare services available."'
167
Besides the loss of health services, children also lose educational and
economic services.
168
C. International Law Governing Children
International law governing children may be found in the broad
realm of human rights law encompassed by treaties, international hu-
manitarian law, customary international law, and in the laws and prac-
tices of individual states. 169 Despite the great variety in the sources of
applicable international law, the law still tends to treat children as ob-
jects rather than subjects 70 -a status that reinforces the old adage
that children should be seen but not heard. Traditionally, children
were presumed to depend on adults to exercise their rights, thus
many earlier international laws targeted child welfare and were more
concerned with a child's socioeconomic and psychological needs than
with facilitating their individual autonomy.171 However, since the In-
162 See RachelJ. Stohl, Under the Gun: Children and Small Arms, 11 AFR. SECURITY REV. 17,
21 (2002); see also Abbott, supra note 115, at 508 ("Throughout history, military groups
have utilized children as soldiers, but in recent years, the deliberate recruitment of child
soldiers has dramatically increased in many global conflicts.").
163 Stohl, supra note 119; see also Machel Report, supra note 38, 27 ("Previously, the
more dangerous were either heavy or complex, but these guns-are so light that children
can use them and so simple that they can be stripped and reassembled by a child of 10.").
164 See Stohl, supra note 162, at 22.
165 Id. at 18.
166 See id. at 18-19; see also Machel Report, supra note 38, 49-57 (explaining the diffi-
culties with reintegrating children back into society after they have served as soldiers).
167 Stohl, supra note 162, at 20.
168 Id. (noting that the proliferation of small arms and the protracted nature of con-
flict make it dangerous for children to attend schools and lessen "basic commercial
services").
169 COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 124, at 55.
170 INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON CHILDREN, supra note 139, at xv.
171 Id.; see also LEAGUE OF NATIONS, O.J. Spec. Supp. 23, at 177 (1924)
By the present Declaration of the Rights of the Child... men and women
of all nations, recogni[z]ing that mankind owes to the child the best that it
has to give, declare and accept it as their duty that...
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ternational Year of the Child in 1979,172 there has been a movement
within the international community to examine international laws
dealing with children from a child rights perspective.173
1. Custommy International Law and International Humanitarian
Law
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 Additional
Protocols comprise the framework for international humanitarian
law. 174 Since these bodies of law apply equally to government and
opposition forces and include all "parties to the conflict,"175 interna-
tional law protects child soldiers in any conflict in which they partici-
pate. 76 Even where a state has not ratified or consented to any
particular treaty, customary international law may still bind it177
"[o]nce a pattern of practice or expectation is generally accepted or
[becomes] extant."'1
78
Most human rights treaties or treaties that protect children are
not self-executing and thus require domestic legislation to create a
private cause of action. 179 Nevertheless, signatories to these treaties
have an ongoing responsibility "to observe [them] with good faith and
scrupulous care." 180 Indeed, the United Nations Charter requires all
signatories, including the United States, to support resolutions
adopted by the Security Council.181 However, depending on whether
the armed conflict is classified as an international armed conflict, a
I. The child must be given the means requisite for its normal develop-
ment, both materially and spiritually;
II. The child that is hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must be
helped; the child that is backward must be helped; the delinquent child
must be reclaimed; and the orphan and the waif must be sheltered and
succoured [sic];
III. The child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress;
IV. The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood and must be
protected against every form of exploitation;
V. The child must be brought up in the consciousness that its talents must
be devoted to the service of its fellow men.
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
172 On December 21, 1976, the United Nations General Assembly passed the enabling
resolution, which urged governments "to review their programmes for the promotion of
the well-being of children and to mobilize support for national and local action programs"
to that end. G.A. Res. 169, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 74, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
31/169 (1976).
173 INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON CHILDREN, supra note 139, at xv.
174 COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 124, at 55.
175 Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176 See id.
177 Id. at 55.
178 Bullard, supra note 137, at 159.
179 Id at 159-60.
180 Id. at 160.
181 U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
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domestic armed conflict, or a civil disturbance, different rules ap-
ply.182 "Governments may have a vested interest.., in declaring that
a conflict in their territories is simply a civil disturbance, and thereby
avoid having to comply with the more stringent standards that would
apply if it was accepted as a non-international, or particularly an inter-
national, armed conflict.
183
2. International Humanitarian Law Governing Child Soldiers
International humanitarian law addresses both child civilians and
child combatants. 184 Starting from the basic tenet that children in
armed conflict are entitled to special treatment, 185 the rules state that
children should not be randomly killed, tortured, sexually abused or
ill-treated. 186 Moreover, children should have priority in receiving ba-
sic necessities such as food and'shelter.187 Lastly, children must be
kept with their families and communities; if separation is unavoidable,
it must be for the shortest possible length of time, and there must be
some mechanism to later identify the child.'88
As previously mentioned, it is widely accepted that children
under the age of fifteen should never be combatants, 189 nor should
they be recruited for the purpose of serving as soldiers-whether vol-
untarily or through compulsory means.1 90 But "when, in contraven-
tion of the law, children under [fifteen] do participate in hostilities
and are then captured, they are entitled to special treatment in the
same way as are child civilians .. "191 Moreover, military recruiters
should only target children between the ages of fifteen and eighteen
with priority accorded to those who are older.192 Finally, the death
182 Kuper, supra note 146, at 42.
183 Id.
184 Id
185 See Geneva Protocol I, supra note 145, art. 77; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),June 8, 1977, art. 4(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Ge-
neva Protocol II]; Kuper, supra note 146, at 42. Both protocols are incorporated within
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. CRC, supra note 134, art. 38.
186 See Geneva Protocol I, supra note 145, art. 77(1); Geneva Protocol II, supra note
185, art. 4(3); CRC, supra note 135, arts. 6, 9, 34, 37.
187 See, e.g., LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 171, at 177; Declaration of The Rights of
The Child, G.A. Res. 1386, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 20, U.N. Doc A/4354
(1959) (Principle 8).
188 See Kuper, supra note 146, at 42 (referring to Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion IV, Article 78 of Geneva Protocol I, Articles 4(3) (b) and (e) of Geneva Protocol II,
and arguably, Articles 10 and 20 of the CRC).
189 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
190 Kuper, supra note 146, at 43 (referring to Article 77(2) of Geneva Protocol I, Arti-
cle 4(3) (c) of Geneva Protocol II, and Article 38(3) of the 1989 CRC).
191 Id. (referring to Article 77(3) of Geneva Protocol I, and Article 4(3) (d) of Geneva
Protocol II).
192 Id. (referring to Article 77(2) of Geneva Protocol I and Article 38(3) of the CRC).
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penalty does not apply to offenses related to conduct committed by
children who are less than eighteen years of age. 19-3
D. Gaps in Existing International Law
Arguably, the international law relating to child combatants is
largely aspirational. 194 That is, international law is "simply a set of
fine-sounding phrases that have, ultimately, little meaning or use for
such children, but that satisfy the conscience of those concerned
about human rights."'1 95 While international law serves as a possible
method of retribution, the unpleasant reality is that only a small per-
centage of war criminals have ever been punished. 196
Moreover, in the context of children in armed conflict, interna-
tional law is a limited tool 97 because of the current gap between the
actual laws pertaining to children and the non-observance of the laws
in practice.' 98 One area in which this gap is particularly salient is the
age limit for recruitment of children in armed forces. For example,
while children eighteen or younger cannot serve as soldiers in the Su-
dan and Sierra Leone, they are nonetheless recruited for this pur-
pose. 199 Unfortunately, no sanctions have been brought against those
who so brazenly ignore the international law governing childrens'
rights.
20 0
These examples illustrate the need for a two-pronged approach
to the problem of child soldiers. Not only must the age limit be
raised, but compliant nations must collectively pressure those coun-
tries that employ child soldiers.20' At the same time, this body of in-
ternational law provides a potentially powerful legal framework from
which child soldiers themselves can agitate for change. In sum, with-
out adequate enforcement mechanisms, international laws protecting
children serve only as window dressing.202
193 Id. at 44 (referring to Article 68 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, Article 77(5) of
Geneva Protocol I, and Article 6(4) of Geneva Protocol II).
194 See id. at 47.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 49.
197 Id. at 50.
198 See Otunnu, supra note 140, at 53.
199 Id. at 60.
200 See Gerison Lansdown, The Convention: Histoy and Impact, in CHILDREN IN EXTREME
SITUATIONS: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE 1998 ALISTAIR BERKLEY MEMORIAL LECTURE, supra note
137, at 6, 9.
201 See Abbott, supra note 115, at 500 (noting that collective pressure is necessary "to
initiate the necessary enforcement and rehabilitative mechanisms").
202 Megan E. Kures, Note, The Effect of Armed Conflict on Children: The Plight of Unaccom-
panied Refugee Minors, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 141, 157-58 (2001) (arguing that
enforcement of the international law dealing with children is the first step towards the
ultimate goal of protecting them); see also Otunnu, supra note 140, at 60 ("[T]he most
important and pressing challenge today is how to translate the impressive body of interna-
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III
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMs ACT (ATCA) OF 1789: AMERICA'S
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw
"[U]niversal condemnation of human rights abuses 'provide[s] scant com-
fort' to the numerous victims of gross violations [of international human
rights law] if they are without a forum to remedy the wrong. ,'o3
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789204 permits aliens to
sue for a tort committed anywhere in the world in violation of the law
of nations or a United States treaty. 20 5 The United States currently
stands alone as the only nation allowing such suits. 20 6 Because there is
little legislative history to guide courts and scholars on the drafters'
intent, interpretations of the statute remain controversial.20 7 How-
ever, two seminal Second Circuit cases, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala20 8 and
Kadic v. Karadii(,209 and a congressional statute, the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA),210 have transformed the ATCA into a
formidable piece of human rights legislation.
This Part illustrates how the ATCA can empower and liberate in-
dividuals from oppressive institutional arrangements by providing a
forum in which to adjudicate their claims. Because the ATCA permits
awards of punitive and compensatory damages, it not only creates a
forum in which to redress wrongs, but also acts as a deterrent for fu-
ture violators of international law.2 11 For example, one Bosnian Mus-
lim plaintiff stated that his case was more about legal accountability
tional norms and local values into commitments that can make a difference to the fate of
children exposed to danger on the ground.").
203 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (second altera-
tion in original).
204 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States."
205 Id.; Kadic v. Karad~it, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995).
206 Developments in the Law-International Criminal Law, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1943, 2033
(2001) [hereinafter Law Developments].
207 Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 104 n. 10; see alsoJeffrey Rabkin, Note, Universal Justice: The Role of
Federal Courts in International Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 2120, 2125-26 (1995) (sum-
marizing four predominant scholarly and judicial theories of the ATCA drafters' intent).
But see Michael D. Ramsey, Multinational Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act:
Some Structural Concerns, 24 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 361, 362-63 (2001) (arguing
that the ATCA's drafters clearly did not intend for the statute to permit "suits against for-
eign corporations for acts occurring outside the United States").
208 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
209 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
210 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. note
§ 1350 (2000)).
211 See Law Developments, supra note 206, at 2042. ATCAjudgments have yielded awards
as large as $4.5 billion. Id. at 2041 n.105; see also Matthew Haggard, A Whopper of a Year,
MIAMI DAILY Bus. REv., Dec. 16, 2002, at 18 (describing the $54.6 million award, including
both punitive and compensatory damages, to three Salvadoran nationals who brought suit
for kidnapping and torture); Judge Awards $140 million in Torture Case, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-
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than money: "I brought this case because I felt an obligation towards
those who were killed or tortured by [the defendant]. "212
A. Alien v. Alien (And Americans Too): The Right to Sue in
U.S. Federal Courts
In Filartiga, Paraguayan citizens sued a former Paraguayan police
official in the Eastern District of New York for wrongful death in the
alleged torture and murder of their son.2 13 The court held that "de-
liberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates
universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights"
and wherever the "alleged torturer is found and served with process
by an alien within our borders, [the ATCA] provides federal jurisdic-
tion."214 Congress endorsed Filartiga's support for an alien's private
right of action under ATCA by enacting the TVPA.21 5 The TVPA is
not ajurisdictional statute itself,216 but rather is a statutory note to the
SENTINEL, April 30, 2002, at 4A (reporting that an Atlanta federal district judge awarded
each of the four Bosnian Muslim plaintiffs $35 million).
212 See Judge Awards $140 million in Torture Case, supra note 211 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
213 630 F.2d at 878-79.
214 Id. at 878. It is important to note that the ATCA only confers subject matter juris-
diction; plaintiffs must still establish personal jurisdiction for cases to move forward. See,
e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 94-99 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants separately in an
ATCA claim); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995), reh' denied, 74 F.3d 377
(2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (holding that defendant personally served
with summons and complaint while in New York, but outside of the U.N. headquarters
district, does not have immunity and is subject to personal jurisdiction); Cynthia A. Wil-
liams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
705, 755-58 (discussing an ATCA case in which defendants did not contest subject matter
jurisdiction but moved to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction). But see Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that, in a parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship, the contacts of the subsidiary are not imputed to the parent for personal jurisdic-
tion purposes).
215 See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 104-05; Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir.
1996); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 443 (D.N.J. 1999). Thus, the TVPA
overruled Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which held
that the ATCA did not provide subject matter jurisdiction. The TVPA reads in relevant
part:
Sec. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ACTION.
(a) LIABILITY. -An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation-
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action,
be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to
any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.
Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. note § 1350 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
216 See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 441-43.
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ATCA extending the ATCA's subject matter jurisdiction and remedy
to "any individual," including U.S. citizens.
217
B. The Act of State Doctrine
While the TVPA expressly creates a cause of action under U.S.
law, 218 it differs from the ATCA in that it "contains explicit language
requiring state action. '219 The act of state doctrine is a common law
rule that prohibits courts of one country from sitting in judgment over
the acts of another country within that other country's own bor-
ders.220 However, under both the TVPA and the ATCA, the state ac-
tion requirement does not preclude suits brought against private
groups or individuals. Under the TVPA, " [c] ertain private groups
may constitute a de facto state, in which case they will be held lia-
ble. . . ."221 In other words, the concern is not for the legitimacy of
the group but its power.222
Comparatively, when no state action exists, courts will narrowly
construe plaintiffs' claims against private parties. 223 Judge Edwards's
pre-TVPA concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic224 es-
tablished the now oft-cited proposition that there are a "handful of
crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibil-
ity."2 25 In other words, because crimes such as slave trading and tor-
217 See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 104-05.
218 See id.; see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (noting that the " [Il]egislative history confirms
that [the TVPA] was intended to 'make clear that the plaintiff must establish some govern-
mental involvement in the torture or killing to prove a claim,' and that the statute 'does
not attempt to deal with . . . purely private groups.'").
219 Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 23 (D.D.C. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, unlike the ATCA, the TVPA has exhaustion of remedies and statute
of limitations requirements. See 28 U.S.C. note § 1350 ("A court shall decline to hear a
claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies
in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred."); id. ("No action shall
be maintained under this section unless it is commenced within 10 years after the cause of
action arose."); see also Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2002) (find-
ing that the statute of limitations provided by the TVPA applies to the ATCA); Cabiri v.
Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1195-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the TVPA's stat-
ute of limitations applies retroactively, especially where plaintiff had fair notice that torture
was not a lawful act); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding
that plaintiff's twelve hours of in-court testimony in Guatemala and the languishing of her
criminal case for several years without resolution prohibited her from bringing a civil ac-
tion in Guatemalan courts and therefore she sufficiently exhausted the local remedies
available to her). But see Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1133 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (noting that "the ATCA does not require exhaustion of local remedies").
220 Ramsey, supra note 207, at 364.
221 Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 9 (D.D.C. 1998) (emphasis added).
222 Id, see also Rabkin, supra note 207, at 2131 ("The inquiry ... is whether a person
purporting to wield official power has exceeded internationally recognized standards of
civilized conduct, not whether statehood in all its formal aspects exists.").
223 Williams, supra note 214, at 764-66.
224 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
225 Id. at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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ture confer individual liability, state action is not necessary for ATCA
liability to attach. 2
26
Kadic v. Karadeii 2 7 is the leading judicial opinion holding private
actors liable for torturous human rights violations.228 In Kadic, victims
from Bosnia-Herzegovina sued a self-designated president of an un-
recognized Bosnian-Serb entity. 2 2 9 Stating that the plaintiffs needed
an opportunity to prove their allegations, the court held that "[a] pri-
vate individual acts under color of law ... when he acts together with
state officials or with significant state aid." 230 Moreover, the court
stated that "atrocities are actionable under the [ATCA], without re-
gard to state action, to the extent that they were committed in pursuit
of violations of the law of nations.
231
"[A] broader array of factual circumstances can give rise to liabil-
ity" if the harm involved state action or a private individual who acted
under color of state law.232 This wider scope is necessary to encom-
pass ATCA claims against corporate actors like gun manufacturers; an
ACTA plaintiff could address the actions of local government and cor-
porate partnerships to curb corporate action. 233 As an example of
how courts might evaluate such a claim, a district court in California
recently upheld the imposition of vicarious liability on a third-party
226 John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 0056628, 00-57195, 2002 WL
31063976, at *9 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Doe 1] ("Forced labor is a modem
variant of slavery to which the law of nations attributes individual liability such that state
action is not required." (emphasis omitted)), vacated sub. nom. Doe v. Unocal, Nos. 00-
56603, 00-56628, 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003). But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (acknowledging the
international law trend "toward a more expansive allocation of rights and obligations to
entities other than states" but declining personally to read the ATCA "to cover torture by
non-state actors, absent guidance from the Supreme Court").
227 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996).
228 See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d. 424, 444 (D.NJ. 1999) (noting that
pre-Kadic decisions only recognized state actors as liable for international law violations).
229 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37.
230 Id. at 245; see also Doe I, supra note 226, at *1 (holding that the defendant Unocal
may be liable under the ATCA); jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 371-72 (D.N.J. 1998)
(finding a correctional facility and its officers, directors and guards to be state actors be-
cause they were performing government services under contract with the INS); cf lwanowa,
67 F. Supp. 2d at 445 ( "No logical reason exists for allowing private individuals and corpo-
rations to escape liability for universally condemned violations of international law merely
because they were not acting under color of law."). But see Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d
440, 449 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that "an indirect economic benefit from unlawful state
action is not sufficient to supportjurisdiction over a private party under the [ATCA]"); Bao
Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 22 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that a "substantial degree of
cooperative action" between a private corporation and the state government was needed to
find a corporation whose soccer balls were assembled by forced labor liable under the
ATCA).
231 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244 (emphasis added).
232 Williams, supra note 214, at 766.
233 Id. at 766-67.
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corporate defendant because it knowingly aided and encouraged the
state's commission of violations.
234
Ironically, "the involvement of a state in the contested activities
can create sovereign immunity problems for plaintiffs." 235 In Aquinda
v. Texaco, Inc.,236 Ecuadorian nationals sued Texaco for damages
caused by the company's oil exploration activities. 237 In response,
Texaco argued that because the Ecuadorian government was an indis-
pensable party, the court should dismiss plaintiffs' claims for failure to
join the Ecuadorian government under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 238 While this argument was ultimately unsuccess-
ful,2 3 9 in other situations involving a sovereign state, the corporate de-
fendant could "argue that the challenged actions were those of the
government partner, which cannot be sued because of sovereign im-
munity or the act of state doctrine, and that the [corporate defen-
dant] cannot be held responsible for how [its] joint venture partners
use their sovereign power. '240 However, the Second Circuit noted in
234 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1142-49 (C.D. Cal, 2002).
235 Williams, supra note 214, at 767 ("[U]nder the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA"), foreign states can be brought into court in the United States to litigate claims
arising from their commercial activities but not to hear claims based upon their sovereign
activities.").
236 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub nom.Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153
(2d Cir. 1998). This discussion comes from Williams, supra note 214, at 752-55. The cor-
rect spelling of the plaintiffs name in this case is "Aguinda," rather than "Aquinda," as the
official reporter states. For purposes of consistency and to eliminate any confusion, this
Note uses the name "Aquinda" as officially reported.
237 See Aquinda, 945 F. Supp. at 626.
238 Williams, supra note 214, at 767. See FED. R. Cir. P. 19 (pertaining to joinder of
necessary parties); see alsoJota, 157 F.3d at 162 ("[S]ince much of the relief sought could be
fully provided by Texaco without any participation by [the government of] Ecuador, dis-
missal of the entire complaint on Rule 19 grounds exceeds [the district court's]
discretion.").
239 A change in Ecuador's government led the state to intervene in support of plain-
tiffs' claim. The Second Circuit felt that this change in position merited consideration. See
Williams, supra note 214, at 754.
240 Id. at 767-68. A plaintiff could also bring a claim under the Foreign Services Im-
munity Act of 1976 (FSIA). See Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000)) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... in...
any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in [28 U.S.C.] 1603(a) . . . as to
any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity. . . . "). Specifically:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case...
... in which the action is based [1] upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or [3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States. ...
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit recently held that "a state engages in
commercial activity ... where it exercises only those powers that can also be exercised by
private citizens, as distinct from those powers peculiar to sovereigns." Doe I, supra note 226,
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Kadic that "it would be a rare case in which [state action] precluded
suit under [the ATCA]."
2 41
C. Elements of an ATCA Claim
1. An Alien Sues for a Tort
A successful ATCA claim must establish that the ATCA encom-
passes the claim and provides a cause of action. 242 As the Eleventh
Circuit noted, "the 'committed in violation' language of the statute
suggests that Congress did not intend to require an alien plaintiff to
invoke a separate enabling statute as a precondition to relief under
the [ATCA] ,,243 However, it is still unclear whether an alien-plaintiff
must establish an ordinary tort that violates international law, or
whether the violation of international law itself is the tort under the
Act.
2 4 4
The Ninth Circuit recently found that a corporate defendant
could be held liable under the ATCA for "aiding and abetting the
Myanmar Military in subjecting [p]laintiffs to forced labor."245 The
court noted that the standard for aiding and abetting in the interna-
tional criminal law context was similar to that for domestic tort law.
2 46
The majority found that, under the ATCA, aiding and abetting is any
"knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial
at *18 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349,
360 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see id. at *19 ("[A] foreign state's conduct
'in connection with a commercial activity' must itself be a commercial activity to fall within
the third exception to foreign service immunity."); see also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162, 176 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that the defendant, a former Guatemalan Minister of
Defense, was not immune under the FSIA for conduct that was beyond the scope of his
official authority). The effect of these rulings is that child soldiers can bring an action
against the gun manufacturing states under FSIA as well as under the ATCA. See Rabkin,
supra note 207, at 2129 (arguing that the ATCA must be viewed in conjunction with both
the TVPA and the FSIA).
241 Kadic v. Karad~ie, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995).
242 Ramsey, supra note 207, at 362-63; see also Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.
2d 424, 438-39 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that ATCA grants a cause of action as well as subject
matter jurisdiction).
243 Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto
PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that "the ATCA does not adopt
wholesale all principles of international law. Rather, it creates a domestic cause of action
for violations of international law.").
244 Most times this should not be a problem given that most human right violations
translate into common law torts. For example, torture is an extreme form of battery, and
placing someone in jail unjustly deprives them of their liberty.
245 Doe I, supra note 226, at *10 (emphasis omitted). However, some courts suggest
that the ATCA does not permit ordinary tort violations. See Law Developments, supra note
206, at 2036-37 & n.86 (outlining court holdings under ATCA dealing with environmental
abuses, restrictions on freedom of speech, libel fraud, misappropriation of funds, and
breach of fiduciary duty).
246 Doe I, supra note 226, at *12.
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effect on the perpetration of the crime." 247 However, in a concur-
rence that demonstrates the nature of the disagreement over the cor-
rect standard, Judge Reinhardt expressed his belief that defendant
"Unocal's third-party tort liability should be resolved by applying gen-
eral federal common law tort principles, such as agency, joint venture,
or reckless disregard," rather than a newly formed international
standard.
248
Other cases also highlight this disagreement over which torts sat-
isfy the ATCA. For example, in Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.,2 4 9 a New
Jersey district court found that the defendant's subsidiary committed a
tort by requiring unpaid forced labor under inhumane conditions.
250
Based on this finding, the court held that the plaintiff satisfied the tort
requirement under ATCA. 251 In comparison, in Jogi v. Piland,252 an-
other district court dismissed the alien-plaintiff's claim because he al-
leged a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
which was not a tort.253 Because of these varied and conflicting deci-
sions and the Supreme Court's continued silence, judges and lawyers
are left uncertain as to what exactly constitutes a "tort" under the
ATCA.2 5 4
2. Violation of the Law of Nations
A threshold question in ATCA claims is whether the alleged tort
violates the law of nations.2 55 To determine whether a violation has
occurred, courts "must consider: (1) whether [the claim] identif[ies]
a specific, universal, and obligatory norm of international law; (2)
whether that norm is recognized by the United States; and (3)
whether [the claim] adequately allege[s] its violation."256 Moreover,
because courts must interpret modern international law, not the law
as it existed in 1789,257 they should "consult[ ] the works of jurists,
writing professedly on public law; or... the general usage and prac-
tice of nations; or ... judicial decisions recognising [sic] and enforc-
247 Id. at *10.
248 Id. at *24 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); see also discussion infra Part III.C.2.a (regard-
ing choice of law challenges faced under ATCA claims).
249 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
250 See id. at 439-40.
251 See id
252 131 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (C.D. Ill. 2001).
253 See id. at 1026 ("Only those treaty provisions that would actually give rise to a tort
action by reason of their violation are implicated by the [ATCA].").
254 See Rabkin, supra note 207, at 2129.
255 See Kadic v. Karadlie, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that "the [ATCA]
requires that plaintiffs plead a 'violation of the law of nations' at the jurisdictional
threshold ....").
256 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
257 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238.
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ing that law."258 Through these means, courts can determine whether
the alleged conduct violates universally accepted international norms,
and therefore violates the law of nations.
259
That a broad array of conduct has been found to violate the law
of nations under this test260 has particular implications for child
soldiers. At the outset, the TVPA expressly provides that extrajudicial
killing and torture are violations of international law, thereby making
the responsible party liable for damages. 261 Moreover, "[i]t is only
where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of
mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express interna-
tional accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an interna-
tional law violation" under the ATCA.262 Because the prohibition on
the use of child soldiers is undisputed under international law, the
selling of arms to public or private actors who use child combatants in
armed conflict is a violation of the law of nations.
258 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); see also Iwanowa v.
Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439 (D.N.J. 1999) (quoting Smith);Jama v. INS, 22 F.
Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998) (same).
259 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238-39.
260 See, e.g., Doe I, supra note 226, at *8 (finding that forced labor is sufficiently widely
condemned that it constitutes a violation of the law of nations); Alvarez-Machain v. U.S.,
331 F.3d 604, 620-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that transborder abduction is a violation of
the law of nations), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 821 (Dec. 1, 2003); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F.
Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that "certain forms of conduct" such as piracy, slave
trade, attacks or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, murder, torture, arbitrary de-
tention of civilians, and certain acts of terrorism violate international law whether under-
taken by the state or a private actor).
261 28 U.S.C. note § 1350 (2000). The TVPA states in pertinent part:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action,
be liable for damages to that individual; or subjects an individual to extra-
judicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages....
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
262 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Doe I, supra note
226, at *8 (noting that because torture is widely condemned, it has achieved jus cogens
status). As the Ninth Circuit observed:
Because the underlying conduct alleged constitutes a violation of custom-
ary international law, the violation was allegedly committed by a govern-
mental entity, and Unocal's liability, if any, is derivative of that government
entity's, jus cogens is irrelevant....
[Moreover,] because there is no requirement that plaintiffs state ajus cogens
violation . . . under the ATCA[, jus cogens is necessary if a non-state actor
engages directly in the unlawful conduct] and that other conduct of private
parties that would violate international law if engaged in by a governmental
entity is not actionable under the ATCA. [Thus,] [t]he well-established
principle that forced labor practices violate customary international law is
sufficient in itself to confer jurisdiction ... jus cogens or not.
Id. at *24-25 (footnotes omitted).
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a. Choice of Law
One unresolved and critical component of a successful ATCA
claim is what law the court should apply.263 Specifically, a court must
decide whether to apply the law of the state where the alleged tortur-
ous conduct took place, the law of the forum, or international law.
2 64
This decision is extremely important as the law that the court applies
determines whether the ATCA claim will survive pretrial motions.
265
Moreover, choice of law issues impact the collection of ATCA judg-
ments abroad.
266
263 Although federal courts do not uniformly address choice of law issues in suits
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, courts will generally apply choice of law principles that
will provide a remedy for a violation of an international norm. See infra Part III.C.2.a; see
also Tracy Bishop Holton, Cause of Action to Recover Civil Damages Pursuant to the Law of
Nations and/or Customary International Law, in 21 CAUSES OF AcTION 2d 327, § 8, at 360-61
(2003) (stating that "[tihe only unifying principal that can be found in these [diverse
federal] decisions is a will to fashion a remedy to the neglect of legal process") In Tachiona
v. Mugabe, a U.S. federal district court synthesized the choice of law principles emerging
from ATCA cases:
(1) the local law of the state where the wrongs and injuries occurred and
the parties reside may be relevant and may apply to resolve a particular
issue insofar as it is substantively consistent with federal common law princi-
ples and international law and provides a remedy compatible with the pur-
poses of the ATCA and pertinent international norms; (2) in the event the
local law of the foreign state of the parties' residence and underlying events
conflicts with federal or international law, or does not provide an appropri-
ate remedy, or is otherwise inadequate to redress the international law vio-
lations in question, a remedy may be fashioned from analogous principles
derived from federal law and the forum state, or from international law
embodied in federal common law; (3) should the application of law from
federal and forum state principles as to some aspect of the claim defeat
recovery, an analogous rule drawn from the municipal law of the foreign
jurisdiction may be applied to the extent it supplies a basis for a decisional
rule that may permit relief; (4) if some part of the claim cannot be sus-
tained as a violation of international law, a remedy might be found by appli-
cation of the foreign state's municipal law under the federal court's
pendent jurisdiction if so invoked.
234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (footnotes omitted).
264 Compare Doe I, supra note 226, at *11 (applying substantive international law to an
ATCA claim), with Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 448 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying the
1986 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States to determine if
there was a violation of the law of nations) and Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226
F.3d 88, 105 n.12 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that the U.S. courts have not resolved the choice
of law issue). Some commentators note that such conduct often violates both international
and U.S. law. See, e.g., Rabkin, supra note 207, at 2142 n.133 (noting that "[o]fficial torture
and extrajudicial killing" are torts under both international law and U.S. common law).
265 See Rabkin, supra note 207, at 2142 ("[Such] distinctions are analytically useful,
because the result of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for
failure to state a claim may turn on how a court" resolves these issues).
266 See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Note, Sue and Be Recognized: Collecting § 1350 Judgments
Abroad, 107 YALE L.J. 2177, 2190-91 (1998).
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Where third-party tort liability under the ATCA is at issue, some
argue that federal common law applies.267 According to this view,
there are "unique federal interests involved in [ATCA] cases that sup-
port the creation of a uniform body of federal common law to facili-
tate the implementation of such claims." 268 Indeed, the essence of
the court's role in an ATCA claim is to "fashion domestic common law
remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law.
'" 269
Some courts have even found that settled international law is inter-
changeable with the law of nations, and thus part of federal common
law.2 70 In fact, the TVPA was enacted to codify the Filartiga holding
that the law of nations is incorporated into U.S. law.
2 71
b. Forum Non Conveniens
Another doctrinal hurdle plaintiffs face is forum non con-
veniens.272 This doctrine is concerned with determining the proper
forum in which to litigate a plaintiffs claim.2 73 Because many mul-
tinational corporations are subject to personal jurisdiction and venue
in the United States, and therefore cannot contest the suit for lack of
jurisdiction or venue, a significant number challenge plaintiffs'
claims on forum non conveniens grounds.274 However, a fundamen-
tal tension exists between the doctrine and the purpose of the ATCA:
267 See, e.g., Doe I, supra note 226, at *26 (Reinhardt, J. concurring) (arguing that the
majority should not apply international law in resolving ancillary legal issues arising under
ATCA).
268 Id.; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) ("[T] he substantive right on which [an alien's action] is based
must be found in the domestic tort law of the United States.").
269 Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (1lth Cir. 1996); cf Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp.
2d 353, 364 (D.NJ. 1998) (suggesting that domestic law may preempt international law
where Congress has "occup[ied] a field so thoroughly" as to manifest its intent for domes-
tic law to govern).
270 See, e.g., Doe I, supra note 226, at *11; Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d
424, 438 n.14 ("The terms 'law of nations' and 'customary international law' are
interchangeable.").
271 See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), repinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.AN. 84, 86. Moreo-
ver, the primary concern in resolving choice of law issues is fairness. See Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980). Thus some consideration should be given to apply-
ing the law where the challenged conduct is actionable under ATCA. Id.
272 As a discretionary judicial device, forum non conveniens allows a court to dismiss a
claim when a suitable alternative forum is available, even in cases where jurisdictional and
venue requirements are met. SeeAquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 2002).
If an adequate forum does exist, the court must weigh a number of factors regarding the
parties' private interests in adjudicating the claim in an alternative forum, and it must
assess any public interests that might be at stake. See id. Moreover, the burden is on the
defendant to prove the existence and appropriateness of an adequate alternative forum in
which to litigate the claim. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 (2d
Cir. 2000).
273 See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 99-101.
274 Matthew R. Skolnik, Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in Alien Tort
Claims Act Cases: A Shell ofIts Former SelfAfterWiwa, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 187, 201 (2002).
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simply dismissing a claim for forum non conveniens frustrates the
congressional intent "to provide a federal forum for aliens suing do-
mestic entities for violation of the law of nations."
275
In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,276 the Second Circuit stated
that under the ATCA, international law violations are "our busi-
ness. "277 Because the status quo of merely condemning violations of
international norms "provide [d] scant comfort" to victims, the court
found that the ATCA and TVPA created a strong domestic policy in-
terest in favor of adjudicating disputes arising thereunder.278 In keep-
ing with this policy, the Second Circuit recently sought to ensure that
the Aquinda plaintiffs had a forum in which to adjudicate their
claims. 279 In that case, the court required that the defendant, Texaco,
subject itself to personal jurisdiction in either Ecuador or Peru before
the court would grant Texaco's motion to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds. 280 Despite this line of precedent, the United States
is the more appropriate forum for child soldier suits because the
ATCA has both the jurisdictional and the remedial powers necessary
to hold corporations accountable for human rights violations.
c. Political Question Doctrine
Another criticism of the ATCA is that it requires 'Judicial
stretches to produce a legal regime in which courts ... become deeply
involved in U.S. foreign policy."28' As such, claims under the Act may
bring nonjusticiable political questions before the federal courts.
Rooted in the concept of separation of powers, the political question
doctrine counsels against adjudicating cases that involve issues more
appropriately addressed by the executive or legislative branches.
282
However, "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."283 Noting
that the doctrine is one of "political questions," not "political cases,"
275 Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998).
276 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
277 Id. at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted).
278 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Aric K.
Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non Conveniens in Human Rights
Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J. IN-r'L L. & POL. 1001, 1034-35 (2001) (suggesting that the Wiwa
court's holding is weakened because it based its reasoning on the TVPA, rather than the
ATCA).
279 See Aquinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 479 (2d Cir. 2002).
280 See id. at 476-79; see alsoJota, 157 F.3d at 159 ("[D]ismissal for forum non con-
veniens is not appropriate.., absent a commitment by Texaco to submit to the jurisdiction
of the Ecuadoran courts for purposes of this action.").
281 Ramsey, supra note 207, at 366.
282 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-13 (1962); Kadic v. Karadfie, 70 F.3d 232,
249-50 (2d Cir. 1995) (outlining the standards for finding a political question, and apply-
ing them to an ATCA claim).
283 Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
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the Kadic court held that the better approach under ATCA is to care-
fully balance relevant considerations on a case-by-case basis.
284
IV
SEEN AND HEARD: EMPOWERING CHILD SOLDIERS UNDER
THE LAW
The gun makers' "see no evil, hear no evil" attitude 28 5 of ignoring
unscrupulous dealers and corrupt brokers who channel firearms to
gray and black markets must end. This insouciant approach fosters "a
culture of evasion of firearm laws and regulations. '" 28 6 As the Burkina
Faso example strongly illustrates, 28 7 gun makers have full knowledge
that selling small arms and light weapons to unauthorized users exac-
erbates and sustains conflicts that involve child combatants. While
corporate legal scholars may argue that the only social responsibility
multinational corporations have is to increase profits, 288 engaging in
business with unauthorized individuals is against the law. Corpora-
tions generally, and gun manufacturers specifically, are just as blame-
worthy as individuals when they violate the brokering and SALW laws
by selling arms to unauthorized users. 2 9 Gun manufacturers facili-
tate-and indeed thrive on-the existence of gray and black markets
and the lack of transparency in SALW sales; they are not simply law-
abiding companies doing business. In other words, gun manufactur-
ers are well aware of the ramifications of their actions, and a successful
lawsuit will create an incentive to incorporate mechanisms for tracea-
bility and accountability of unauthorized users, thus minimizing the
use of child soldiers. 290
284 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249-50 (refusing to dismiss an ATCA claim on grounds of nonjus-
ticiability); see also Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that
plaintiffs claim for torture and cruel, inhumane treatment was not barred by the political
question doctrine). But see Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 489 (D.N.J.
1999) (finding that plaintiffs claims of forced labor during the Nazi era were
nonjusticiable).
285 See Butterfield, supra note 64, at A14 (internal quotation marks omitted); Glaber-
son, supra note 63, at B1.
286 See Butterfield, supra note 64, at A14 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the unregulated SALW market).
287 See discussion supra Part I.C.
288 See, e.g., Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals In Host Countries: Can They Be
Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Right Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
927, 930 (1998) (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)).
289 "Unauthorized user" here encompasses not just crooked brokers and dealers or
outright criminals, but also governments and insurgent groups that use children as
combatants.
290 The accountability and traceability standards established for the international fi-
nancial institutions serve as a possible model for similar standards here. See supra text
accompanying notes 84-86.
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A. The ATCA is the Most Appropriate Statute For Child Soldier
Lawsuits
The ATCA is a powerful "avenue toward breaking down the politi-
cal shield protecting [gun manufacturers] from scrutiny."29 1 Because
international law dealing with child soldiers is generally not self-exe-
cuting,29 2 the ATCA can aid enforcement by providing a cause of ac-
tion for torts committed in violation of international law. That is, if a
plaintiff alleges a violation of international law prohibiting the use of
children in armed conflict, the ATCA can both compensate and deter
future violations. However, while a cause of action under the ATCA is
theoretically possible against every actor or entity involved in SALW
proliferation, 293 these individual defendants are typically unavailable
for suit.294 Gun manufacturers are the most plausible defendants
given their level of complicity with, and encouragement of, the sale of
SALW to unauthorized individuals.
29 5
B. Child Soldiers v. Gun Manufacturers: The Lawsuit Can Work
1. Gun Manufacturers Committed a Tort in Violation of the Law of
Nations
Under the ATCA, a child soldier would likely succeed against
SALW manufacturers. The child soldier plaintiff would sue for a tort
committed in violation of the law of nations: the sale of small arms
and light weapons .in contravention of customary international law
and U.S. brokering law. The child soldier would then argue that these
sales perpetuate both armed conflicts and the recruitment of children
in these conflicts.2 96 If the child soldier plaintiff could not prove a
direct violation of the law of nations, she could alternatively claim that
SALW manufacturers negligently marketed the weapons.29 7 Moreo-
ver, while the factual and procedural thresholds of an ATCA suit are
considerable, the proximate cause requirements for successful gun lit-
igation suits 298 under the ATCA are lower than under domestic tort
291 Sacharoff, supra note 288, at 930.
292 See supra text accompanying 179.
293 See supra Part III.A.
294 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 72-73; see also Lucinda Saunders, Note, Rich
and Rare Are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers Accountable for Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24
FORDHAM IN-r'L LJ. 1402, 1472 (2001) (arguing in favor of suing De Beers under the ATCA
where the insurgent groups were unavailable for suit).
295 See supra Parts I.B.3, I.C.
296 See discussion supra Parts I, II.
297 Cf Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Inju-
ries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industy, 65 Mo. L.
REv. 1, 26-31 (2000) (discussing a successful domestic suit against a California gun manu-
facturer for, inter alia, negligently marketing ("overpromoting") a particular firearm
model).
298 See supra Part III.C.
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law. All a child solider plaintiff must show is that the manufacturers
are violating the law of nations.299 As the Burkina Faso example illus-
trates, SALW manufacturers are on notice that their behavior consti-
tutes such a violation. 300
Gun makers violate international law governing children in
armed conflict when they blatantly disregard the broker-dealers with
whom they do business. Rebel and government groups rely on the
proliferation of SALW to fight wars. Thus, gun manufacturers who
knowingly sell to unauthorized users or legal users who ultimately
transfer the weapons to insurgent groups not only contravene the laws
regulating the SALW proliferation, but also knowingly aid and en-
courage the employment of child soldiers by these groups.301 In the
alternative, because the International Labor Organization deems the
use of child soldiers to be a violation of child labor laws, 30 2 child plain-
tiffs can argue that the use of child soldiers is a modem form of slav-
ery-a violation of international law for which state action is not
required. 30
3
The defendant-manufacturers will likely argue that the plaintiffs
lack the necessary facts to show complicity. Specifically, they will deny
responsibility for the actions of third parties, in this situation the in-
surgent groups or governments that are recruiting child combat-
ants. 30 4 However, plaintiffs can defeat this argument by showing that
the gun manufacturers could not act without the assistance of govern-
ment authorities in the contracting of weapons sales, and vice versa. 305
2. Child Soldier Plaintiffs Can Overcome the Procedural Hurdles
Defendants, whether the Ukrainian Ukrspetsexport or an Ameri-
can-based gun company, will likely seek dismissal on forum non con-
veniens grounds.30 6 The child soldiers, however, have no alternative
299 See discussion supra Part III.C.2; see also Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189,
1195-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that the TVPA applies retroactively where defendants
had notice that torture was an unlawful act).
300 See supra Part I.C.
301 See supra Part II.B (discussing the impact of SALW proliferation on children).
302 See Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimina-
tion of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, art. 3(a), 38 I.L.M. 1207, 1208,
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/ratification/convention/
text.htm.
303 See supra note 226.
304 Cf discussion supra Part I.B.2.a (describing the NRA's arguments against gun man-
ufacturer liability for victims of violent crimes).
305 See, e.g., Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 22 (D.D.C. 2000).
306 There is also a related personal jurisdiction issue for defendant gun manufacturers.
Plaintiffs will most likely prevail on this issue because many international organizations
have business ties with the United States. The intricate involvement of the multifarious
actors in the SALW trade will likely establish sufficient contacts to the United States. See
generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (establishing
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forum in which to bring their suit. While the International Criminal
Court (ICC) has declared the recruitment of children under the age
of eighteen to be a violation of international law, and thus could pro-
vide a suitable alternative forum, the ICC will only hear cases concern-
ing crimes committed after July 1998.307 Also, even though some
states, such as Sierra Leone, have statutes permitting suits for war
crimes against child combatants, such forums tend to be dangerous
for the child soldier plaintiff because the governments of those states
often participated in the original weapons purchase. 308 Even if an-
other forum is available, the interests of justice require that the court
direct the defendants to either submit themselves to personal jurisdic-
tion in the alternative forum or to the United States.
30 9
Finally, gun manufacturers will likely invoke the political question
doctrine in their defense. The only potentially political question in
this area, however, is the age at which a child may participate in war.
The international consensus, even in the United States, is that no mat-
ter how the legislature defines a child's age, a child must not and
should not participate in war.
3 10
CONCLUSION
Currently, there are an estimated 300,000 children under the age
of eighteen mobilized for war efforts either by legitimate state govern-
ments or rebel groups. 311 While authorities suggest that there is no
direct causal link between SALW and child soldiers, substantial re-
search indicates that armed conflict and the subsequent violence com-
mitted by children have escalated because of the proliferation of small
arms and light weapons. Child soldiers are defenseless individuals
who have been robbed of their childhood; they should not be ex-
ploited for the sake of filling the financial coffers of gun manufactur-
ers. Gun manufacturers who sell to insurgent or government entities
that use child soldiers commit a tort in violation of the law of nations
for which they should be held liable. The Alien Tort Claims Act is a
the current minimum contacts standard for establishing personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that a defendant
corporation must have sufficient contacts with the United States as fairness and justice
require).
307 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1988, art. 11(1),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1010 ("The Court has jurisdiction only with re-
spect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute.").
308 See supra note 22 (discussing the "grey market" in SALW).
309 See supra Part III.C.2.b. For a specific example of defendants contesting personal
jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying notes 279-80 (discussing Aquinda v. Texaco,
Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 2002)).
310 The international debate revolves around the minimum age defining "child," not
whether those so defined should enter combat. See discussion supra Part II.A.
311 See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
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key tool that child soldiers can use to combat SALW proliferation and
its accompanying human rights abuses.
